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Abstract
Language engineers often point to tight connections be-
tween their systems’ linguistic representations and accumu-
lated sensor data as a sign that their systems really mean what
they say. While we believe such connections are an impor-
tant piece in the puzzle of meaning, we argue that perceptual
grounding alone does not sufﬁce to explain the speciﬁc, sta-
ble meanings human speakers attribute to each other. Instead,
human attributions of meaning depend on a process of soci-
etal grounding by which individual language speakers coor-
dinate their perceptual experience and linguistic usage with
other members of their linguistic communities. For system
builders, this suggests that implementing a strategy of soci-
etal grounding would justify the attribution of bona ﬁde lin-
guistic meaning to a system even if it had little perceptual
experience and only modest perceptual accuracy. We illus-
trate the importance and role of societal grounding using an
implemented dialogue system that collaboratively identiﬁes
visual objects with human users.
Introduction
In this paper, we treat meaningful language use as an explicit
design goal for conversational systems: they should mean
what they say. We argue that achieving this goal requires
that implementations explicitly connect system meaning to
societal standards. Part of using language meaningfully, we
claim, is working to keep your meaning aligned with what
others mean in your community. Our case rests on strong
intuitions about speaker meaning in speciﬁc contexts. We
draw on these intuitions to understand and to criticize imple-
mentations that construe meaning in exclusively perceptual
terms, and to articulate an alternative approach.
Systems that use language face a traditional line of objec-
tion that any meaning in a computer program’s “utterances”
is merely parasitic on the intentions and interpretations of its
programmers. In its strongest form (Searle 1980), the prob-
lem is seen as endemic to computation: none of the sym-
bols in a computer program, including any linguistic repre-
sentations it may have, are ever intrinsically meaningful to
the system; at best, it is argued, we engineer and arrange
them in such a way that they seem meaningful to us. Other
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well-known arguments dispute the meaningfulness of lan-
guage use in speciﬁc extant systems; the symbols they use
to achieve linguistic meaning have been variously held to be
hopelessly impoverished due to the limited range of infer-
ences the system is able to draw using them (Dreyfus 1979),
limited problematically to the “narrow micro-world” of the
programmer’s chosen domain theory (Winograd & Flores
1986), or effectively meaningless due to the lack of any cou-
pling with the external world via perception (Harnad 1990).
The general thrust of these objections is that people ﬁnd
it hard to ascribe genuine meaning, of any sort, to dis-
embodied, decontextualized, perceptionless computer pro-
grams. A common response has been to see the key to mean-
ing as lying in a process of perceptually grounding a com-
puter program’s representations in real sensor data (Harnad
1990). While originally formulated as a strategy for imbu-
ing arbitrary internal symbols with meaning, this approach
has been thought to apply straightforwardly to symbols that
link words to the world; indeed, many AI researchers ex-
plicitly advocate achieving linguistic meaning through per-
ceptual grounding (Oates, Schmill, & Cohen 2000; Roy &
Pentland 2002; Cohen et al. 2002; Yu & Ballard 2004;
Steels & Belpaeme 2005).
This paper contests this view. Perceptual grounding, as
it has been understood, is neither necessary nor sufﬁcient to
justify the attribution of linguistic meaning. Human inter-
locutors achieve stable, speciﬁc meanings in linguistic com-
munication by coordinating their perceptual experience with
linguistic usage across their community through a process
we call societal grounding. Participating in this process is
a prerequisite for intuitive ascriptions of speaker meaning,
and yet realizing this process robustly would justify saying
a system meant what it said even if it had little perceptual
experience and only modest perceptual accuracy.
Our argument links questions about meaning in imple-
mented systems to the phenomenon of meaning borrow-
ing described in the philosophy of language (Kripke 1972;
Putnam 1975). We use this connection to develop a system-
atic characterization of societal grounding, and then sketch
an architecture for realizing societal grounding within the
information-state approach to dialogue management (Lars-
son & Traum 2000). Our concluding discussions position
computation as a framework that can continue to inform the
study of meaningfulness in machines and in humans.Appears in AAAI 2006. 2
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(U1) C: it’s a square
(U2) U: you mean a
rectangle?
(U3) C: no
(U4) U: which square?
(U5) C: the square
(U6) U: there is no square
C: [ ignores this ]
(U7) C: the square is solid
Figure 1: User interaction with the COREF agent. The user
(U:) can see the four displayed objects, but not COREF’s
(C:) private labels {a,b,c,d} for them. The target in this
example is object a.
A motivating example
Figure 1 shows an excerpt of an interaction with COREF,
an implemented dialogue agent designed to collaboratively
identify visual objects with human users (DeVault et al.
2005). In this interaction, COREF’s goal is to get the user
to identify object a, the solid red rectangle. COREF begins
by utteringU1, it’s a square — even though the target object
is not a square. In order to diagnose the remainder of this
dialogue, and in pursuit of our goal of meaningful language
use, we would like to understand what COREF means by its
uses of the term ‘square’ in U1, U5, and U7. If it does not
mean what its human users mean when they say ‘square’,
we would like to understand why not.
As it happens, COREF represents the meaning of its uses
of ‘square’ with an internal symbol, square. COREF clas-
siﬁes any object x as square when
(i) rectangle(x)
& (ii) length(x)
width(x) ≤ 1+ε (1)
In this case, COREF classiﬁes object a as square, because
a is classiﬁed under COREF’s rectangle symbol, and
its dimensions satisfy (ii). Any perceptual classiﬁer would
need a tolerance threshold such as ε to allow for noise in its
length estimates. The exact value ε takes is unimportant; we
caricature COREF’s misclassiﬁcation in our depiction of a.
We will use this interaction to gradually develop a ﬁne-
grained understanding of the interplay between linguistic
meaning, mental meaning, and system design. For nota-
tion, we will write square for the property that COREF’s
user means by ‘square’, for example in utterances U4 and
U6. The questions we now wish to examine carefully are:
Does COREF mean square when it says ‘square’? If not,
is this because COREF’s internal symbol square does not
mean square? What engineering would be required in order
to make COREF mean square?
Linguistic meaning and speaker’s beliefs
To make our argument for the role of societal grounding in
linguistic meaning, we will examine a series of alternative
conditions that might be thought necessary in order for an
agentAto meanM by a use of linguistic termT. Each condi-
tion can be seen as an attempt to specify under what circum-
stances A could be said to “understand” what is allegedly
meant. For example, according to the historically inﬂuential
“description theory of meaning”, competent speakers know,
for each term, some description or set of properties that iso-
lates the term’s meaning; see e.g. (Devitt & Sterelny 1999).
We might endorse this theory with the following condition:
A does not mean M by T unless A associates
T0s meaning with a set of properties that
uniquely identiﬁes M.
(2)
The properties that COREF associates with the meaning
of ‘square’ in (1) do not uniquely distinguish instances of
square (as evidenced by object a), so the description theory
counsels that COREF does not mean square by ‘square’.
However, in the 1970s, compelling arguments emerged in
thephilosophyliteraturethat, contrarytothedescriptionthe-
ory, a speaker’s meaning in using a term depends not just on
what the speaker privately believes about the term’s meaning
but also strongly depends on perceptual and social factors
(Kripke 1972; Putnam 1975; Burge 1979). From the stand-
point of AI, the most important arguments against the de-
scription theory are what philosophers have called the prob-
lems of ignorance and error (Devitt & Sterelny 1999): peo-
ple mean what they say even when they lack complete and
correct knowledge of meaning. For example, Putnam (1975)
argues persuasively that a human speaker can use the words
‘elm’ and ‘beech’ to mean elm and beech (the two types
of tree) despite being unaware of any (non-linguistic) prop-
erty that distinguishes elm trees from beech trees. When
such a speaker asks of a tree “Is that an elm?”, he still in-
quires meaningfully whether it is an instance of elm. Nor
do erroneous beliefs seem to undermine linguistic meaning;
a human speaker can still mean elm when he says “Is that
an elm?” even if he falsely believes that every tree to which
‘elm’ applies is less than 30 meters tall.
In designing a meaningful agent, we take it as a method-
ological constraint that we ought not impugn the meaning-
fulness of the system on grounds that could also impugn the
meaningfulness of its human users. Thus, (2) is not a gen-
eral principle according to which we can deny the mean-
ing square to COREF’s utterances of ‘square’. The inaccu-
rate properties in (1) that COREF associates with ‘square’
could just be analogous to the properties a meaningful hu-
man speaker erroneously associates with ‘elm’.1
Nevertheless, something is clearly wrong with COREF:
it doesn’t seem to mean square, and this fact seems to ex-
plain the miscommunication in Figure 1. Philosophers have
suggested that the mechanism by which a human speaker
is able to mean elm when he says ‘elm’, despite being un-
able to characterize that meaning accurately, is that there is
a division of linguistic labor within a community (Putnam
1Parallel possibilities of ignorance and error rule out (2) as a
condition on human meaning for mass terms like ‘gold’ or ‘water’
(Kripke 1972; Putnam 1975), medical terms like ‘arthritis’ (Burge
1979), artifacttermslike‘pencil’(Putnam1975)or‘chair’or‘sofa’
(Devitt & Sterelny 1999), or for names like ‘John’ or ‘Socrates’
(Kripke 1972), among others.Appears in AAAI 2006. 3
1975). The idea is that some members of the community
of human English speakers have had perceptual contact with
elms, and thereby have acquired an accurate ﬁx on that type
of tree; other community members who are less experienced
are somehowable to“borrow” themeaning ofthe term ‘elm’
from these “experts”. A non-expert speaker’s meaning is
thus determined not by his private beliefs about or experi-
ence with elms but instead by a chain of “meaning borrow-
ing” events that begins with the speaker, leads along some
path through the members of the community, and ﬁnally ar-
rives at an expert whose experience does ﬁx the meaning
(Kripke 1972).
To date, philosophers have not produced a clear theory of
the ﬁne-grained perceptual and social details needed to fully
explain this “meaning borrowing” mechanism; see (Devitt
& Sterelny 1999) for a recent survey. In the meantime, how-
ever, AI researchers have made considerable progress in ar-
ticulating the sorts of detailed connections between system
representations and sensor data that might justify attribut-
ing genuine meaning to implemented agents’ mental states.
In the next two sections, we explore, in the context of this
research, how perceptual experience and social interactions
might combine to produce genuine linguistic meaning in im-
plemented systems.
Linguistic meaning and speaker’s perception
Perception is the gateway between an agent’s mental state
and the external world, and as such it clearly plays an impor-
tant role in assigning external meanings to an agent’s inter-
nal representations. One tempting way to formalize this role
is to simply identify a representation’s meaning with some
perceptual measure. For example, Oates, Schmill & Cohen
(2000) identify the meaning of the verb ‘pushed’ with dis-
tinctive sequences of robot sensor values. Gorniak & Roy
(2004) identify the meaning of ‘green’ with a probability
distribution over image RGB values. Cohen et al. (2002) de-
ﬁne the meaning of ‘square’ as the probability that ‘square’
is uttered given that an object perceived as having a certain
height-to-width ratio is under discussion.
Understanding linguistic meaning in such direct percep-
tual terms might lead us to endorse the following “discrimi-
nation condition” on linguistic meaning:
A does not mean M by T unless A can
perceptually discriminate instances of
T0s meaning, M, with high accuracy.
(3)
According to the discrimination condition, whether COREF
means square when it says ‘square’ depends on how accu-
rately it can perceptually discriminate instances of square.
SupposeCOREFwereabletoinferthepropertiesin(1)from
sensor data and thereby achieve a perceptual accuracy of,
say, 90%.2 Would this perceptual accuracy be sufﬁcient for
COREF to mean square?
The problem with requiring any particular accuracy as a
requirement for linguistic meaning is again that we will in-
2In fact, COREF currently works from a hand-built domain rep-
resentation that includes the properties in (1). I.e. it does not infer
these properties from sensor data.
evitably deny linguistic meaning to human speakers who we
strongly believe have it. For example, an “ignorant” human
speaker who asks of a nearby tree, “Is that an elm?”, and is
privately unaware of any distinguishing difference between
elm and beech trees, may very well lack the capacity to per-
ceptually distinguish elms from beeches. Yet even lacking
this perceptual skill, he can still meaningfully ask whether a
certain tree is an instance of elm. Thus, the discrimination
condition suffers from a problem of perceptual ignorance,
and it therefore cannot serve as a general principle accord-
ing to which we could deny a meaning like square to an
agent based solely on its modest perceptual accuracy.3
Despitethepossibilityoflimitedperceptualaccuracy, per-
haps a speaker A’s perceptual experience with instances of
M is still the ultimate arbiter of A’s meaning. Perhaps A
has to at least have perceived some instance(s) of M in or-
der to linguistically mean M by some term T. For example,
Yu & Ballard (2004) use eye tracking and image segmen-
tation techniques on camera images to build a perceptually
grounded representation of the object (a piece of paper) that
a human user is ﬁxating when she utters the word ‘paper’.
Perhaps such a historic perceptual exposure must ground an
agent’s internal representation of what a term means before
linguistic meaning is possible:
A does not mean M by T unless A represents
T0s meaning by some internal symbol S that
means M because A has perceptually
grounded S in instances of M.
(4)
According to this “perceptual exposure condition”, COREF
could not mean square unless its internal symbol square
were grounded by historic perceptual exposure to squares.4
We believe there is a substantive “causal insight” underlying
this condition, which brings several advantages to a theory
of linguistic meaning. First, identifying linguistic meaning
with the external cause of a perceptual experience (Kripke
1972) liberates the bearer of that meaning from necessarily
having accurate belief or perceptual discrimination, which
we have already found problematic.5 Second, it suggests a
“causal-historical” analysis in which every meaningful men-
tal symbol can be traced back to some historical perceptual
event that gave it its meaning. If such an event can be de-
scribed as connecting a mental symbol to the external object
or property that is its meaning using only the causal vocab-
ulary of physics (Harnad 1990), then mental meaning will
have been “naturalized”. Further, condition (4) suggests that
linguistic meaning can be reduced to such mental meaning,
so that these two difﬁcult problems can be solved at once.
3The possibility of perceptual ignorance also rules out (3) as a
condition on human meaning for the terms in footnote 1.
4In fact, COREF’s symbol square is not so grounded.
COREF’s “perception” currently begins with a hand-built domain
representation rather than real sensor data.
5The fact that A has causally interacted with some instance of M
(e.g. by way of a camera) does not entail that A’s beliefs about M
will be accurate, or that A will be able to recognize other instances
of M when A sees them.Appears in AAAI 2006. 4
But it must be possible for the connection between lin-
guistic meaning and perceptual experience to be less direct
than condition (4) suggests. Our “ignorant” human speaker
who inquires, “Is that an elm?” may well have never seen
an instance of elm before.6 Yet we strongly believe he
still means elm. Somehow, this perceptually inexperienced
speaker seems able to borrow this meaning after mere lin-
guistic contact with other speakers who use the word ‘elm’
(Kripke 1972). This ability of a human speaker to speak
meaningfully about things he has not directly encountered
does not mean that speakers’ perceptual histories are irrel-
evant to their linguistic meanings. However, it does mean
that we cannot appeal to (4) as a general principle to deny
linguistic meaning to an implemented agent like COREF.
Linguistic meaning and societal grounding
In the previous two sections, we have argued that linguis-
tic meaning is not precluded by various inadequacies in a
speaker’s beliefs, perceptual abilities, or perceptual experi-
ence. An ignorant and perceptually inexperienced speaker
can still achieve meaning through meaning borrowing and
the division of linguistic labor. This doesn’t mean meaning
is easy to achieve. On the contrary, we think meaning bor-
rowing itself must be understood as a hard-fought achieve-
ment. Language affords us the crucial freedom to speak to
one other about things some of us may not have ﬁrst-hand
experience or expertise with, but that freedom carries spe-
cial responsibilities to coordinate with others about what we
believe and what we perceive. It requires us to work to keep
our private representations of linguistic meaning aligned.
Thus, even in cases of meaning borrowing, these respon-
sibilities continue to make belief and perception essential to
linguistic meaning.
We call an agent’s coordination of its linguistic meanings
with the community societal grounding. Building on the
causal insight underlying condition (4), we can describe so-
cietal grounding as a relation between a speaker, an internal
symbol, and a linguistic meaning:
Deﬁnition.7 Agent A has societally grounded internal sym-
bol S in meaning M iff both conditions D1 and D2 are met:
D1. S means M, because either:
1. A has perceptually grounded S in instances of M, or
2. A has heard some other member B of the linguistic
community use term T, where:
(a) In fact, B meant M by T, and
(b) A uses symbol S to represent what B meant by T.8
6Let’s suppose the tree in question is a beech not an elm.
7This deﬁnition is intended to characterize a natural phe-
nomenon that we believe exists and deserves further investigation.
8To be clear: We do not intend the meaning of S to be identiﬁed
with the description “what B meant by T”, but rather with the refer-
ent of that description. The symbol S means M, the external-world
individual or property that is in fact B’s meaning, whether or not A
has any independent experience or understanding of this individual
or property. What A knows for certain about what S means is that
the causal connection between S’s meaning and S is mediated by B.
D2. A is committed to an active and consistent cognitive
role for S. In particular:
1. A is linguistically committed to S:
(a) AentertainsSasarepresentationforwhatotherspeak-
ers mean by their terms in conversation, and
(b) When A derives a representation involving S to cap-
ture the content of some proposition P that has been
(credibly) asserted or implied in conversation, A rec-
onciles9 P with private beliefs and perceptual classi-
ﬁers that use S.
2. A is perceptually committed to S:
(a) A entertains S as a representation for what A perceives
when A acquires a perceptual experience, and
(b) When A derives a representation involving S to cap-
ture the content of some perceptual experience E, A
reconciles9 E with private beliefs and perceptual clas-
siﬁers that use S.
We express a speaker’s obligation to societally ground his
representations of linguistic meaning as follows:
A does not mean M by T unless A represents
T0s meaning by some internal symbol S that
A has societally grounded in M.
(5)
Condition (5) and clause D1(2)(a) thus make societal
grounding and linguistic meaning interdependent.
In order for a speaker A to mean elm by ‘elm’, according
to (5), A must have societally grounded some internal sym-
bol, say elm, in the meaning elm. Requirement D1 distin-
guishes two alternative origins for the connection between
elm and its meaning. If A perceived an instance of elm and
thereby perceptually grounded the symbol elm, then D1(1)
is satisﬁed. Alternatively, D1(2) allows that A may instead
be using the symbol elm as a representation for whatever
some other agent, B, meant by some term.10 If what B meant
was elm, A “borrows” elm as the meaning for elm.
Requirement D2 demands, as the price of meaning elm
in conversation—by way of symbol elm—that the speaker
remain “engaged” with new evidence from other speakers
and from perception that may bear on what elm means. If A
uses elm to represent A’s meaning in asking a local expert
“Is that an elm?” about a nearby tree, D2 obliges A to try to
exploittheanswertoimproveA’sbeliefsandperceptualskill
at recognizing instances of whatever it is that elm means.
Concretely, A’s belief state might include statistical in-
formation like P(height(x)≤30m|elm(x))=0.9343, and
A might perceptually classify a perceived object x under its
elm symbol using a set of camera image features I(x). We
can view these aspects of A’s mental state as constituting
A’s “understanding” of elm as a representation of linguistic
meaning. Since elm really means elm, we can say that A
understands more about what its symbol elm means when
Note also that there is no guarantee that A does not have a different
symbol that, unbeknownst to A, also means M.
9as A’s other goals permit
10Most likely, the term B used was ‘elm’.Appears in AAAI 2006. 5
A’s belief state involving elm is closer to being true and
when A’s perceptual classiﬁer for elm is more accurate.
If A derives the representation elm(tree3) to represent
the local expert’s answer of “Yes” to A’s question about the
nearby tree, requirement D2(1)(b) obliges A to adopt some
strategy to reconcile elm(tree3) with A’s understand-
ing of what elm means, to keep elm societally grounded.
For example, P(height(x) ≤ 30m|elm(x)) might be re-
estimated using the observation height(tree3)=32.7m,
and A’s perceptual classiﬁer might be re-trained using a pos-
itive instance with image features I(tree3).
D2 might appear to be just a basic condition on rational
“meaning borrowing”. If A created the symbol elm with the
intention that it would mean whatever some other agent B
meant on a certain occasion, that intention imposes a com-
mitment for A to persist in tracking what B meant by ex-
ploiting new evidence as it arrives; cf. (Cohen & Levesque
1990). Yet something deeper is at play here: even if A
perceptually grounded elm using A’s own prior experience
with instances of elm, A may still understand very little
about what kind of things in the world elm has been linked
up with. Due to a poverty of experience, A’s belief state
and perceptual classiﬁers for elm, which encode A’s under-
standing of what else would be the same kind of tree, may
be wildly or uncomfortably inaccurate. This is why require-
ment D2 applies even if the origin of the meaning of A’s
symbol lies in A’s own perceptual experience.
Thus, on the view we are advocating, meaning is always
seen by an agent as an external target that the agent needs
to think about and act in pursuit of. This gives meaning an
important place in an agent’s mental life and in psycholog-
ical theory, as summarized by requirement D2, even though
the facts about meaning, as indicated by requirement D1, are
always determined by factors external to the agent. We be-
lieveitisthecommitmentthatlanguagespeakershavetothis
pursuit, rather than the truth of their evolving beliefs or the
accuracy of their evolving perceptual skills, that underwrites
our ascriptions of linguistic meaning to each other.
For example, we began by noting how very hard it seems
to attribute the meaning square to COREF’s utterances of
‘square’ in the interaction of Figure 1. We are now in a
position to state why this is, and to answer the questions
that motivated our various attempts to characterize linguis-
tic meaning clearly. The problem is not that the properties in
(1) which COREF associates with what it means by ‘square’
do not isolate the property square (though they do not).
The problem is not that COREF lacks a perceptual classiﬁer
that discriminates instances of square with high accuracy
(though it lacks one). Nor is the problem that COREF has
not perceptually grounded its symbol square in sensory
experience with instances of square (though it has not).
The problem is that COREF just isn’t committed in the
ways it needs to be to mean square when it speaks. At utter-
ance U6, the user categorically denies that square is instan-
tiated in the visual display. According to requirement D2
for societal grounding, COREF ought to recognize that the
user’s assertion conﬂicts with its belief state for its square
symbol and do something about it. But as currently imple-
mented, COREF ignores any user utterance it cannot inter-
c
a b
d
(U1) C: it’s a square
(U2) U: you mean a
rectangle?
...
(U6) U: there is no square
(U∗
7) C: isn’t the solid one
a square?
(U∗
8) U: no
(U∗
9) C: ok
(U∗
10) C: it’s not a square
(U∗
11) C: it’s the solid one
Figure 2: Hypothetical user interaction with an improved
COREF agent. Utterances U1-U6 are as in Figure 1. Utter-
ances U∗
i are hypothetical and do not reﬂect COREF as cur-
rently implemented. In this interaction, COREF usesU∗
7-U∗
8
to societally ground its symbol square.
pret as a clariﬁcation question or as a move in its collabora-
tive reference task. This leads COREF to ignore this utter-
ance, along with the evidence it could have provided about
the symbol square. Alas, COREF proceeds to call object
a ‘square’ once more in U7. This lack of commitment to
its symbol square is why COREF does not mean square
when it says ‘square’.11
Implementing linguistic meaning
We have argued that it takes special work, over and above
what is needed for mental meaning, for an agent to achieve
linguistic meaning. To illustrate how we can begin to imple-
ment this extra work, Figure 2 shows a hypothetical interac-
tion with an improved version of COREF that implements
societal grounding. Let’s suppose that COREF has previ-
ously borrowed the meaning square for its symbol square
from one of its users, and that COREF currently classiﬁes
objects as square using the properties in (1). Accord-
ing to D2(1)(a), COREF should entertain square as repre-
senting what the user means by ‘square’ in U6, “there is no
square”. Since square does represent the user’s meaning,
COREF should derive a representation like ¬square(a)
as implied by U6. Further, COREF should try to reconcile
¬square(a) with its private beliefs and perceptual classi-
ﬁers. Since(1)classiﬁesaassquare, COREF’sstrat-
egy for implementing its commitment might lead it to con-
ﬁrm the user’s implication by askingU∗
7, “isn’t the solid one
asquare?” WhentheuserconﬁrmsinU∗
8 that¬square(a),
COREF could discharge its commitment by some algorith-
mic adjustment to the factor ε in (1).
In fact, we can begin to implement societal grounding as
achieved in interactions like this one using techniques that
already allow dialogue systems like COREF to reason ﬂexi-
bly about meaning and the evolving state of a collaborative
conversation. Figure 3 illustrates how COREF could rep-
resent this particular negotiation. As the conversation pro-
11It is very hard to state what COREF’s symbol square does
mean, if anything, since COREF does not currently implement per-
ceptual grounding or meaning borrowing.Appears in AAAI 2006. 6
Information State Utterance Interpretation
Task Stack Facts
CollabRef(t) square(a),solid(a) (U1) C: it’s a square C asserts addcr(t,square(t))
CollabRef(t) square(a),solid(a),
square(t) (U2) U: you mean a
rectangle?
U does Downdate(U1)
U does Push(CollabRef(S))
U does Push(YNQ)
U asserts ynq(addcr(S,S = rectangle))
YNQ
CollabRef(S)
CollabRef(t)
square(a),solid(a) (U3) C: no C asserts no(addcr(S,S = rectangle))
CollabRef(S)
CollabRef(t)
square(a),solid(a) (U4) U: which square?
U does Pop(CollabRef(S))
U does Reinstate(U1)
U does Push(WhichQ)
U asserts whichq(addcr(t = )))
WhichQ
CollabRef(t)
square(a),solid(a),
square(t) (U5) C: the square C asserts addcr(t,t = a))
CollabRef(t) square(a),solid(a),
square(t),t = a (U6) U: there is no square *
U does Downdate(U5)
U does Push(NegotiateFacts)
U asserts addFacts(¬square( ))
NegotiateFacts
CollabRef(t) *
¬square(a),solid(a),
square(t) (U∗
7) C: isn’t the solid
one a square?
*
C does Push(YNQ)
C asserts ynq(addFact(square(a)))
YNQ
NegotiateFacts
CollabRef(t)
*
¬square(a),solid(a),
square(t) (U∗
8) U: no * U asserts no(addFact(square(a)))
NegotiateFacts
CollabRef(t) *
¬square(a),solid(a),
square(t) (U∗
9) C: ok * C does Pop(NegotiateFacts)
CollabRef(t) *
¬square(a),solid(a),
square(t) (U∗
10) C: it’s not a square * C asserts addcr(t,¬square(t))
CollabRef(t) *
¬square(a),solid(a),
¬square(t) (U∗
11) C: it’sthesolidone * C asserts addcr(t,t = a)
CollabRef(t) *
¬square(a),solid(a),
¬square(t),t = a
Figure 3: A trace of the information states and utterance interpretations that COREF could employ to model the user interaction
of Figure 2. Representations for utterances U1-U5 reﬂect the implemented COREF agent, while representations marked by an
asterisk (*), for utterancesU6-U∗
11, are hypothetical and do not reﬂect COREF as currently implemented.
gresses, COREF maintains an evolving context representa-
tion called an information state (Larsson & Traum 2000)
that tracks the tasks and subtasks that are underway, the facts
that are agreed by the interlocutors, and other contextual de-
tails. In particular, COREF’s information state already rep-
resents and tracks the intended speaker meanings from prior
utterances in order to interpret and answer clariﬁcation ques-
tions likeU2, as in (Purver 2004).
COREF generates and understands utterances by drawing
on grammar and context to link words to actions that trans-
form the information state. For example, Figure 3 shows
how U1 corresponds to the action addcr(t, square(t)),
which adds the fact square(t) to the information state; this
fact serves as a constraint on the the target t which COREF
intends the user to identify. The clariﬁcationU2 temporarily
cancels or “downdates” the effects of U1 on the information
state and starts a nested collaborative reference subtask to
identify the value of S, a variable introduced into the context
to represent COREF’s meaning in using the word ‘square’
inU1. COREF’s task knowledge speciﬁes a network of pos-
sible next actions for each task, including the possibility of
opening or closing nested subtasks as in U2. COREF also
approaches each task with a strategy for selecting actions to
further the task and achieve a favorable outcome. These rep-
resentations already give COREF the ability to interpret and
answer yes–no and wh-questions likeU2,U4, andU∗
7.
Accordingly, Figure 3 suggests that modeling societal
grounding in COREF is a matter of extending COREF’s
existing repertoire with suitable additional grammatical re-
sources and collaborative activities. We treat U6 as aAppears in AAAI 2006. 7
move that starts one of these new activities: it pushes a
NegotiateFacts subtask in which interlocutors will work
together to resolve conﬂicting representations of aspects of
the current situation. In this case, the issue is which objects
are squares. The subsequent question–answer pair applies
COREF’s existing language and task representations; the ef-
fect is that COREF agrees that there are no squares, pops
the negotiation subtask, and brings its revised understanding
back to the ongoing process of collaborative reference.
Of course, we’ll need more than just this representation
and architecture to implement systems that pursue such di-
alogues effectively. One obvious challenge comes in scal-
ing up models of grammar and collaboration to the range of
human linguistic behavior that naturally occurs in meaning
negotiation dialogues, like U6 −U∗
9 in Figure 2. Another is
developing strategies to accommodate conﬂicting evidence
about linguistic meanings, as when different users use the
same term in different ways. Are there two different mean-
ings, or is one of the users wrong? A system could confront
users over any unexpected usage, or simply follow what they
do (while aggregating noisy evidence into a single model of
linguistic meaning). More generally, we will need strategies
to balance meaningfulness with other system design goals.
The theory of societal grounding suggests that responses
to these challenges will ﬁt together to help us build open-
ended agents that work with their interlocutors to extend
their competence. Of course, robust systems would see wide
deployment, in areas from information management to en-
tertainment, wherever it proves infeasible to circumscribe
users’ linguistic behavior during system development. De-
signing for open ended linguistic competence seems a mys-
tery, or even an impossibility, to authors like Winograd and
Flores (1986). To us, it is a matter of correctly interfacing
social, linguistic and perceptual abilities, and when broken
down this way it seems amenable to familiar methodologies,
particularly in language technology.
Meanings, communities and languages
Our approach connects speakers to the external-world ob-
jects or properties they mean in conversation. It does this by
distinguishinghavingarepresentationofsomethingexternal
from having accurate understanding of that thing. Under-
standing tends to come slowly, with experience, over time,
but a speaker can have a meaningful representation by sim-
ply listening and forming the right commitments. Think-
ing computationally about this distinction can help us clar-
ify the cognitive and social processes required for mean-
ing in humans as well as machines. We will give three
examples: characterizing our deference to experts, describ-
ing how meaning connects language users to each other, and
linking our shared meanings to our individual knowledge of
language. This discussion may clarify our view as it per-
tains both to models of practical dialogue and to the general
project of understanding intelligence as computation.12
12While this paper addresses only perceptible, external-world
meanings—due to our interest in dialogue systems that deal in such
meanings—webelievethepresenceofsocietalgroundingmayhelp
explain conversation about entities that no one has ever perceived.
According to the division of linguistic labor, meaning
grounds out when a chain of meaning borrowing terminates
in an “expert”. This expert is a speaker who has perceptual
experience of some object or property, who draws on this
perception (rather than what others mean) for his own lin-
guistic meaning, and who manifests sufﬁcient understanding
that other speakers choose to borrow that meaning. In terms
of our deﬁnition of societal grounding, experts have percep-
tually grounded some representation of the external world
(asin D1(1)), arecommittedtothatrepresentation(asin D2),
choose to represent their own linguistic meaning in terms of
that representation (as in (5)), and serve as sources for other
speakers who elect to borrow that meaning from them (as
in D1(2)). Clearly, any speaker can become an expert for
any meaning. Expert status just requires that the expert and
other community members choose to ground their linguistic
meanings in the expert’s perceptual experience rather than
someone else’s.
The interconnectedness between speakers who borrow
meanings from each other can make it tempting to think of
linguistic meaning as “distributed” throughout a network of
language users, rather than located in any particular place.
The fact that an “ignorant” English speaker means elm when
he says ‘elm’, rather than some other meaning, depends on
a chain of historic meaning borrowing events in which dif-
ferent community members each play their part at a spe-
ciﬁc point in the past. By analogy, the fact that this speaker
means elm is similar to the fact that the speaker has a cer-
tain person P as their great-grandmother: what makes P the
speaker’s great-grandmother is a sequence of historic events
in which different people played important parts at speciﬁc
points in the past. While we wouldn’t ordinarily say that
the fact that P is the speaker’s great-grandmother is “dis-
tributed” throughout the historic members of the speaker’s
genetic community, we might say that the explanation for
this fact, or the set of factors that make it true, is so dis-
tributed. Likewise, societal grounding provides a historic,
community-based explanation for the fact that an “ignorant”
English speaker means elm, but it does not suggest that the
fact itself, or the meaning itself, is somehow “distributed”.
With this perspective, we can now see that societal
grounding remains compatible with a fairly traditional un-
derstanding of linguistic knowledge (Chomsky 1995). Cog-
nitive science is concerned with the psychological mecha-
nisms that govern the internal linguistic representations in
a speaker, or what Chomsky calls I-language (internal lan-
guage). Yet each speaker also has their own idiosyncratic
cognitive representations of the external world (as they have
experienced and understand it), including their representa-
tionsoflinguisticmeaning. WherewedepartfromChomsky
is in narrating the cognitive mechanisms of societal ground-
ing not only as internally realized computations but also in
terms of explicit connections between speakers and their
external environments. If our view is correct, then speak-
ers themselves pursue these connections, not necessarily
through a single, shared abstraction, like “the English lan-
guage”, but rather through their own perception and a net-
work of local authorities whose expertise provides a path to
meaning.Appears in AAAI 2006. 8
Conclusion
We conclude with two contributions our perspective brings
to the methodology of system building. First, our approach
shows how conversational systems can borrow, represent,
and use meanings from the start, and learn about them while
they use them. Thus we can narrate the interaction in Fig-
ure 2 as COREF learning something about what speakers
mean by ‘square’, while at the same time using the word
‘square’withastable, consistent, andcorrectmeaning. Such
a description would not be possible if linguistic meaning
were identiﬁed with a perceptual measure. For example,
even if COREF were to retrain its square classiﬁer af-
ter the user expresses ¬square(a), COREF would use
‘square’ with a new meaning in U∗
10, because the perceptual
classiﬁer that is the agent’s meaning would have changed.
Second, by allowing us to ascribe public meanings to
what our systems say, we can be clear about what they mean
and whether they are right or wrong. This way, we can try
to build them to be right. It might be worried that societal
usage can never fully settle the correctness of an agent’s us-
age, because different speakers can mean different things by
the same terms. But such ambiguities are fully compati-
ble with societal grounding as the arbiter of what is really
meant: condition D1 establishes a correct meaning, for each
mental symbol, according to the actual chain of events that
connects a symbol to its meaning. Of course, agents must
still select particular symbols to represent what other speak-
ers mean; societal grounding explains how ambiguities can
arise without putting the facts about meaning up for grabs.
Contrast this with the multi-agent simulation of Steels
and Belpaeme (2005), in which agents maintain weighted
associations between linguistic terms and different percep-
tual classiﬁers that serve as alternative linguistic meanings
for the agents. The agents realize a commitment to com-
municative success in society by adjusting these weights to
encourage success and penalize failure in a simple language
game. But in the absence of clear standards for correctness
in linguistic meaning, the model lumps together all failures
in communication, even though, for example, being misun-
derstood and right seems very different from being under-
stood and wrong—as one strongly suspects COREF is in ut-
teranceU1 of Figure 2.
In the end, we believe that bringing our semantic intu-
itions into correspondence with system design is essential
for building agents we can relate to. To act meaningfully,
conversational agents must faithfully realize the interrelated
capacities that underpin our judgments of meaning in in-
teractions with one another. We have argued that societal
grounding is such a capacity, so that as implemented tech-
niques for societal grounding become more robust, users
will become more comfortable attributing bona ﬁde linguis-
tic meaning to implemented systems; conversely, AI re-
searchers will be able to present more principled evidence
that their systems really mean what they say.
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